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POINTS 
Appellant relies upon the following points for a reversal 
of the judgment: 
Point 1 
THE DECREE IS CONTRARY TO LAW BE-
CAUSE IT DEPRIVES SEELY OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN HIS LAND AND CASTS BURDENS UP-
ON HIS LAND FOR THE BENEFIT OF LASSON 
WHICH ARE NOT SANCTIONED BY THE LAWS OF 
THIS STATE 21 
Point 2 
THE DECREE IS CONTRARY TO LAW BE-
CAUSE IT RESTRAINS SEELY FROM DOING 
SOMETHING HE HAS NEVER THREATENED TO 
DO AND HAS NO INTENTION OF DOING 25 
Point 3 
THAT PART OF FINDING NO. 9 WHICH IS 
TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT IMPOUNDED 
WATERS OF THE SLOUGH AND THEREBY PRE-
VENTED PLAINTIFF FROM RECEIVING WATERS 
TO THE USE OF WHICH HE IS ENTITLED IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY BUT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE 27 
Point 4 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 12 IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE 30 
Point 5 
THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT ARE 
CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE LASSON WAS A 
TRESPASSER ON SEELY'S LAND AND THE CON-
CLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
IN FAVOR OF SEELY 33 
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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ARTHUR R. LASSON, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, / 
vs. ) NO. 7603 
JUSTUS O. SEELY, V 
Defendant and Appellant. 1 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages and 
for an injunction, alleging in his complaint that defendant 
had placed a dam in Panawats slough, which he threatened 
to maintain, and thus deprived plaintiff of the use of water 
for irrigation purposes to which he had a right. (JR 1) 
Defendant in his answer and counterclaim, while ad-
mitting that he did place the dam in the slough on his own 
land, denied that he thereby deprived plaintiff of the use 
of any water or damaged him; and alleged that plaintiff 
trespassed on defendant's land by entering thereon with-
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out the consent of defendant and removing the dam, for 
which trespass he demanded judgment for damages against 
plaintiff. (PR 8) 
The trial court found the issues in favor of plaintiff 
(JR 16) and awarded him judgment for damages and costs 
and enjoined defendant from maintaining the dam. (JR 24) 
Defendant made a motion for a new trial (JR 30), 
which was overruled on September 26, 1950, and defendant 
appeals from the judgment. (JR 34) 
Appellant Seely is the owner of the south half of the 
south half of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, 
S. L. M., in Sanpete County, Utah; subject to rights of way 
for railroad, state highway and a county road. His title is 
in fee simple. Patent therefor was issued by the United 
States to William H. Seely on his homestead entry on Au-
gust 6, 1878. The patent contains the usual reservations 
found in all such instruments since 1866 that the title is 
subject to vested water rights and ditch and reservoir rights 
acquired under local laws and customs. (Tr. 4-5). But there 
are no ditches or canals or reservoirs on this land with 
which this case is concerned. 
Panawats slough is a natural stream of water which 
flows from south to north across Seely's west forty. Las-
son is the owner of the right to the use of the waters of the 
slough for irrigation purposes at all times material to this 
case. His point of diversion from the slough is somewhat 
over three-fourths of a mile north and down stream from 
Seely's north boundary, and about one mile from the dam 
which Seely placed in the slough. 
The slough has its source in springs which arise on the 
forty adjoining Seely's west forty on the south. The run-
off of irrigation waters applied to Seely's lands lying to 
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the east of the dam and to lands lying south of his land, 
and the runoff of the rains and melting snows which fall 
upon Seely's land, and the percolating waters from all of 
those lands drain into the slough on Seely's land. 
The natural or normal flow of Panawats slough, after 
the high water season, which usually ends about the 15th 
of June, is about 0.51 c. f. s., according to a series of meas-
urements made by Lasson over a weir a short distance 
above his point of diversion. (Tr. 117, 150, 214, 215) 
The natural flow of the stream is augmented by the 
runoff from Seely's lands. (Tr. 301, 309, 136) At times 
during hot days there is not sufficient water in the stream 
from the natural flow to reach Lasson's point of diversion. 
(Tr. 184) 
Panawats slough, where it crosses Seely's west forty, 
used to be a swale with gently sloping banks. At the point 
where the dam was placed the slough is 80 feet wide from 
crest to crest and 6.4 feet deep; at a point about midway 
between the dam and the north boundary it is 55 feet wide 
from crest to crest and 6 feet deep; and at the north bound-
ary it is 62 feet wide from crest to crest and 4.6 feet deep. 
(Ex. 1 and Tr. 240) Floods which came down in 1924 and 
1941 (Tr. 241) cut a gulch or channel with vertical banks 
in the bottom of the slough. This gulch at the dam is 15 
feet wide and 3.4 feet deep; at the middle point it is 18 feet 
wide and 4 feet deep; and at the north boundary it is 20 
feet wide and 1.6 feet deep. (Ex. 1 and Tr. 188, 233, 240, 
273) The cutting of this gulch, which is so deep under the 
railroad bridge that a man can ride a horse under the 
bridge (Tr. 18), resulted in damage to Seely's land. The 
tract in the west forty, which lies west of the railroad track, 
was bisected. The part east of the slough was made un-
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available for pasture because livestock cannot cross the 
gulch. The tract west of the slough and back to the foot-
hills cannot be irrigated unless water is carried across the 
slough. The whole tract was drained and the pasture in-
jured. (Tr. 299, 243) 
Seely purchased the property in 1947. In the spring 
of 1948, when he was cleaning up around the place, he in-
structed his hired men to dump the collected trash in the 
slough, which they did at a point 224 feet west from the 
railroad bridge where there had been a dam years before. 
(Tr. 286) It was his intention to place a series of dams 
in the slough on his own land, to the height of the perpen-
dicular banks of the gulch which had been caused by the 
floods. His idea was to restore the slough to its ancient 
condition. By so doing he hoped to repair the damage 
which had been done to his land by the floods and to pre-
vent further damage from additional erosion, to be able to 
make use of the pasture between the slough and the rail-
road right of way by filling in the slough up to the top of 
the steep banks so that cattle can cross over, to retard the 
drainage of his pastures adjacent to the slough so that the 
grass will not dry out, and be enabled to carry some of 
his irrigation water across the slough to sub-irrigate the 
tract of about two acres of meadow on the west of the 
slough. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
The findings of fact, omitting the captions and recitals, 
are as follows: 
" 1 . That the Panawats Slough is a natural water 
course with well defined bed and banks in and through 
which water has flowed for more than 50 years last 
past and for a time to which memory of men runneth 
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not to the contrary; and all waters gathered therein 
from all sources has been appropriated by the plaintiff 
and his predecessors in interest and applied on lands 
for irrigation thereof and stockwatering purposes from 
June 15 each and every year until December 31, each 
and every year, and by the plaintiff and others called 
canyon users from March 1 each and every year, until 
June 15 next, each and every year, for irrigation of 
lands and have been applied to a beneficial use. Said 
Panawats Slough extends through the immediate west 
part of defendant's land in a westerly and northwest-
erly course which lands of the defendant is described 
as follows: (Description omitted.) 
And said land of the defendant is also known as the 
South half of the South half of Section 5, Township 12 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in 
Sanpete County, Utah, and across said lands at all 
times herein mentioned has flowed and now flows the 
appropriated waters of the plaintiff and others afore-
said and the center line of the said Panawats Slough 
is approximately 6 feet East of the following described 
course of said Slough through the said defendant's 
land to-wit: (Description omitted.) 
"2. That plaintiff's land to which the water of 
said "Panawats Slough" at all times herein mentioned 
has flowed, and been appropriated, and now flows, is 
described as follows: (Description omitted.) 
"3. That at all times herein mentioned and for 
more than 50 years last past, plaintiff and his predeces-
sors in interest have been, and plaintiff now is, the sole 
owner and user of all the waters which gather into 
and flow in said Panawats Slough from all sources 
from June 15 to December 31, each and every year; 
and from June 25 at 6 o'clock a. m. to June 30 at 6 
o'clock a. m. and from July 10 at 6 o'clock a. m. to 
July 15 at 6 o'clock a. m. called 5 turns of each and 
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every year, the said plaintiff with others called can-
yon users are the owners of the right to use all the wa-
ters of Panawats Slough and one-fourth of Rock Creek 
and one-fourth of Clear Creek and all of Thistle Creek. 
And during said two 5 day turns and from March 1 to 
June 15 of each and every year, plaintiff is the owner 
with lower canyon users in Utah County, Utah of the 
right to use all of the waters of said Panawats Slough. 
'That during the period of March 1, to June 15 
of each year, the plaintiff and the said lower canyon 
users have been and now are the owners of the right 
to the use of all of the waters of said Panawats Slough 
plus sufficient flow of the waters of Thistle Creek, Rock 
Creek, and Clear Creek during said period to be meas-
ured across two weirs, one at the lower end of Pana-
wats Slough located in the Southeast quarter of the 
Southeast quarter of Section 31, Township 11 South, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Utah 
County, Utah, and one weir located about 1300 feet 
East thereof in the West one-half of the Southwest 
quarter of Section 32, Township 11 South, Range 4 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah County, Utah, to equal 
one-half the quantity of the waters of said Thistle 
Creek, and one-fourth of Rock Creek, and one-fourth 
of Clear Creek, which flows across a weir, near their 
junction in Section 3 Township 12 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, Sanpete County, Utah. 
"4. That the plaintiff and his predecessors in in-
terest since 1894 have been the owners and plaintiff 
is now the owner of the right to the use of said wa-
ters of Panawats Slough as hereinbefore set out upon 
approximately 75 acres of his above described tracts 
of land in Utah County, Utah. 
"5. That the water flow in said Panawats Slough 
is fed from living springs of water of which so many 
are located at and near said water course and by seep-
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age water also called percolating water that accumu-
lates in said Slough from lands lying at a higher alti-
tude to the East and West and South thereof and with-
in Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, and 17 in Township 12 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Sanpete County, Utah. 
"That said seepage water also called percolating 
water and living spring water and all run-off water 
upon lands lying to the South and West and East there-
of collect and gather into said water course called 
Panawats Slough and make the flow thereof, 
"That said flow is not constant and depends in 
some degree upon the amount of water applied on high-
er lands for irrigation and the spring waters and the 
annual rainfall on the surrounding catchment area 
therof. 
"6. That the plaintiff and his predecessors at 
times and as above set out have been for more than 
50 years last past, the appropriators of the right to use 
all the waters of said Panawats Slough and have at all 
times applied said water therefrom to a beneficial use 
for irrigation of lands and stock watering purposes; 
provided, however, that the Indianola Irrigation Com-
pany, a corporation, has the duty of delivering said 
water of said Panawats Slough together with a frac-
tional part of the waters of Clear Creek, Rock Creek, 
and Thistle Creek, to said plaintiff and other users 
called canyon users from March 1, each and every year 
to June 15 next, each and every year as is more par-
ticularly described in the decree of the First Judicial 
District Court of the Territory of Utah, entitled Ed-
ward Simons, et al, vs. Williams Seely et al., dated 
September 28, 1894, Case No. 3217, in the Clerk's Of-
fice of Utah County, Utah; but on and after June 15 
each and every year up to and including December 13 
of each and every year the plaintiff and his predeces-
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sors in interest during all of said 50 years last past 
and more have been and plaintiff now is the sole owner 
and complete owner of the right to use all of the wa-
ters of said Panawats Slough on and after June 15 to 
December 31 following, each and every year; except 
for said two 5 day turns hereinbefore set out and has 
at all times applied said water from said Panawats 
Slough upon his lands hereinbefore described and also 
used same for stockwatering purposes. 
"7. (Omitted). 
"8. (Omitted). 
"9. That the defendant Justus O. Seely, on and 
between the 16th and 18 days of June, A. D. 1949, went 
upon said natural water course of the Panawats Slough 
at a point about 451 feet North and 258 feet East of 
the Southwest corner of Section 5, Township 12 South, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Sanpete 
County, Utah and then and there constructed a dam 
across said water course, Panawats Slough, about 35 
feet long at the top and diameter consisting 
of shaft of trees, rubbish, old stoves, cast iron, wood, 
decayed hay, manure, and rocks and thereby obstruc-
ted the flow of water in the said so called Panawats 
Slough and backed the water up stream at said dam 
and from said dam in one fork thereof for about 1100 
feet and in another fork thereof for about 1700 feet 
and during the period from June 18 to June 29, 1949, 
inclusive, defendant detained and impounded upon his 
land and on the land of others lying immediately South 
of his land the said waters of said Panawats Slough 
and prevented said waters owned by said plaintiff and 
appropriated by plaintiff and his predecessors in in-
terest from flowing down said water course, Panawats 
Slough, to plaintiffs land hereinbefore described. 
"10. That on the 29th day of June, 1949, the plain-
tiff in order to recover his said appropriated water, 
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backed up stream and impounded on land as aforesaid 
by said defendants wrongful and unlawful construc-
tion of said dam was compelled to, and did, go upon 
said stream in the Southwest quarter of the Southwest 
quarter of Section 5, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Sanpete County, Utah, 
at the point of location of said dam hereinbefore de-
scribed and then and there removed a portion of said 
dam necessary to permit water to flow to the lands of 
the plaintiff in said Pannawats Slough. 
"11. That some time during the spring of 1950, 
said defendant, by his servants and agents, caused a 
substantial part of said dam to be restored and replaced 
in said channel and said Panawats Slough; that he now 
threatens, and will, unless enjoined, maintains said 
dam and place other dams in said channed of said Pan-
nawats Slough on his land and without any devices 
therein to permit the waters of the plaintiff to flow 
to plaintiff's said lands as said waters have heretofore 
substantially flowed in undiminished quantity. 
"12. That said acts of the defendant, his servants, 
and agents on and between the 16th to the 18th and 
the 29th day of June, 1949 deprived the plaintiff of his 
water right of said Pannawats Slough and during said 
period, the hay crop of the plaintiff was thereby di-
minished upon plaintiff's land in the quantity of seven 
tons and his grain crop on said land was thereby di-
minished in the quantity of 25 bushels; that the rea-
sonable value of the hay per ton, after the expense of 
harvesting same were deducted was $9.00 per ton of 
a total of $63.00. That a fair market value of the 
wheat lost as aforesaid to plaintiff was $1.75 per bushel 
on a total of $43.75. That the reasonable value of the 
costs of labor that was expended by the plaintiff to 
remove portions of said dam as aforesaid was $20.00, 
making a total damages in the sum of $126.75. That 
if the defendant be permitted to reconstruct the said 
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dam and to construct other dams in said Pannawats 
Slough on his lands, as he threatens to do, he will 
thereby continue to trespass upon the water rights of 
the plaintiff for which plaintiff has no plain speedy or 
adequate remedy at law. 
"13. That plaintiff did not trespass upon the lands 
of the defendant above described on the 29th day of 
June 1949 when he went upon said lands and removed 
part of the dams placed in said channel by the defend-
ant as aforesaid and defendant suffered no damage 
thereby." 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
" 1 . That the defendant Justus O. Seely, on and 
between June 15 and June 29, 1949, unlawfully and 
wrongfully interfered with the water right of the plain-
tiff in Pannawats Slough by obstructing and detaining 
the flow of the water in the natural channel of said 
Pannawats Slough upon the lands of the defendant and 
upon lands of other owners immediately joining de-
fendant's land on the South thereof. 
"2. That the defendant had no right to place said 
dam in said channel upon his own land and thereby 
obstruct and diminish the flow of the waters of said 
Pannawats Slough and prevent said water from reach-
ing the lands of the plaintiff during said time. 
"3. That plaintiff is entitled to have issued 
herein an injunction restraining and enjoining the de-
fendant from reconstructing and maintaining the afore-
said dam in said Pannawats Slough and from construct-
ing other dams in said slough on his land on the South-
west quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 5, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, in Sanpete County, Utah and which will ap-
preciably obstruct the natural flow of water in said 
channel; except where and when dams will not sub-
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stantially obstruct said flow, he may construct check 
dams in said natural channel where necessary to ar-
rest the speed of the water flow and protect existing 
perpendicular banks from caving if necessary, but such 
practice must not destroy the existing bed and banks 
of the natural channel so as to destroy said bed and 
banks and form a new channel through which said wa-
ter will flow\ 
"4. That the plaintiff is entitled to have and re-
cover of the defendant Justus O. Seely, the sum of 
$126.75 damages and his costs herein incurred.'' 
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
The judgment and decree is in two parts, the first part 
incorporating substantially all of the findings of facts, 
which the writer deems it unnecessary to incorporate in 
this brief, and the latter part being as follows: 
"Therefore, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
"That the said defendant, Justus O. Seely, his 
agents, servants, and employees be and they are here-
by perpetually restrained and enjoined from in any 
manner obstructing, impounding, or diverting the wa-
ters of said Pannawats Slough, so as to interfere with 
the rights of the plaintiff as heretofore found and de-
creed, except said defendant may construct check dams 
in said natural channel if necessary to arrest the speed 
of the water flow therein and protect the existing bed 
and perpendicular banks from caving. However, if 
said defendant should construct check dams in said 
channel, they must be so placed therein as not to de-
stroy the present perpendicular banks or alter the bed 
of said stream, or appreciably interfere with or ob-
struct the usual, ordinary and continuous flow of the 
water therein to the plaintiff s land aforesaid. 
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"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
"That the plaintiff had the right to go upon the 
defendant's land at the place where the defendant had 
built the dam in said slough to remove the same so 
that plaintiff could obtain his water and the defendant 
was not damaged in any manner or at all by plaintiff 
by reason thereof, and defendant's counterclaim is de-
nied and dismissed. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
"That the plaintiff do have and recover of the de-
fendant, Justus O. Seely, the sum of $126.75 damages 
and his costs incurred herein, taxed in the sum of 
$94.50." 
n. 
ARGUMENT 
By way of introduction and before coming to the points 
upon which appellant will rely for a reversal, we desire to 
call the Court's attention to the waters which are involved, 
the nature of L&sson's right therein, and to some of the 
rights of the land owner; bearing in mind that Seely does 
not deny Lasson's right to the use of the waters of Pana-
wats slough. But we believe it is important to understand 
what are the waters of Panawats slough. So let us consider 
the natural flow of the stream, the rains and snows, the 
Canyon waters, the irrigation waters, and the percolating 
waters in Seely's land in their relation to the rights of Seely 
to use and to do with his land as he may please. 
(a) The natural flow of the stream, measured at the 
weir on Lasson's land during the period of the year with 
which we are concerned in this case, is about .51 c. f. s. 
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The following table is prepared from measurements made 
by the plaintiff and testified to by him. He gave his meas-
urements in inches over a six-foot weir and the conversions 
to cubic fee per second were made by him. (Tr. 24, 215) 
(Tr. 150) 
May 10 3y2 inches 
May 11 214 
May 13 6M> 
May 16 (Rained) 12.86 c. f. s. 
May 17 (Rained) 37.98 c. f. s. 
May 18 (Rained) 13 inches 
May 19 9 
May 20 11 
May 21 11 
May 22 8 
May 25 6% 
May 28 6% 
May 29 6 
May 30 4 
May 31 4 
June 1 4 
June 2 4 
June 3 3 
June 4 .. 6 " 
June 5 .. 5y2 
June 6 5 
June 8 5 
June 9 9 
June 11 4 
June 12 4 " 
June 13 3.75 
June 14 3.25 " 
June 15 2.50 
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(Tr. 117) 
June 17 1.34 c. f. s. 
June 21 (Minimum) 34 c. f. s. 
June 23 (Rain) . . 1.12 c. f. s. 
June 27 51 c. f. s. 
June 28 51 c. f. s. 
June 30 72 e. f. s. 
July 1 51 c. f. s. 
July 2 .51 c. f. s. 
July 8 51 c. f. s. 
July 10 51 c. f. s. 
July 16 51 c. f. s. 
Let it be remembered that the basis of the plaintiff's 
complaint is that he was deprived of the use of water by 
reason of the dam from June 6 to June 29, 1949; and that 
the dam was removed on the 29th. Bear in mind also that 
the water users in Thistle Valley were put on turns on the 
15th of June and the Canyon waters which had been flow-
ing over Seely's meadows and the meadows of the other 
owners to the south of his lands had been turned down the 
creek or were being taken in turns, so that the streams 
which had been running over the meadows and into the 
slough up to that date were now no longer contributing 
their waters to the flow of the slough. These conditions 
and not the presence of the dam were what caused the drop 
in the stream from 2.50 inches on June 15th to 1.34 c. f. s. 
on June 17 and to .34 c. f. s. on the 21st of June. The in-
crease to 1.12 c. f. s. on June 23rd is attributable to the rain. 
When these factors are taken into account it is quite ap-
parent that the natural, steady flow of the stream is rather 
constant at .51; and that if there was any dimunition at all 
on account of the dam, it was only the difference between 
the constant flow of 0.51 c. f. s. and the .34 c. f. s. on June 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
21, which is .17 c. f. s., which is the most that was lost to 
Lasson on account of the dam and so far as the evidence 
shows he lost that for only the one day. 
(b) The Canyon waters are the water rights which are 
decreed to the plaintiffs in the action in Utah County in 
which the Smith Decree was entered in 1894. Plaintiff is 
successor in interest to some of these parties plaintiff and 
defendant is successor in interest to some of the defendants 
in that action. It has been the immemorial custom for the 
Canyon waters to be diverted from Thistle Creek and per-
mitted to flow over the Seely meadows and the meadows 
south of his until it becomes necessary for them to be turned 
down the main channel of Thistle creek in order to make up 
the flow that the Canyon users are entitled to receive. After 
flowing over the meadows, these waters empty into the 
slough and go on down to Lasson and the other Canyon 
users. Seely claims no right to impede or diminish the flow 
of these waters or to use them in any way except as they 
have always been used. They have no importance in the 
situation after the waters of Thistle creek are put on turns. 
No complaint is made as to them, as the complaint is in re-
lation to a time when they are no longer contributing to 
the flow of the slough. These are not the waters which 
Seely proposes to carry across the slough to the two acres 
of meadow on the west thereof. 
(c) The irrigation waters are waters which Seely 
brings to his land out of Thistle creek and which are dis-
tributed to him by the Indianola Irrigation Company be-
cause of his ownership of stock in that company. Any run-
off from Seely's lands from the application of these waters 
necessarily flows into the slough. These waters are Seely's 
personal property so long as he keeps them on his land and 
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under his control and does not abandon them. As Kinney 
says (Vol. 2, page 1153, Kinney on Irrigation and Water 
Rights in the Western States): "After water has been 
appropriated and diverted from a natural stream into 
ditches, canals, or other artificial works, it becomes personal 
property and cannot be appropriated from such works." 
Not only does the runoff from the irrigation of the 
land by these waters contribute to the flow of Panawats 
slough but also there is a contribution to the slough through 
the percolation of these waters through the land and into 
the slough. During the summer months, after the Canyon 
waters are no longer being applied to the meadows, these 
are the only waters which contribute to the flow of the 
stream through percolation. 
Seely has the right to control the use of the irrigation 
waters on his own land. Lasson's right to the use of the 
waters of the slough gives him no vested right in these wa-
ters so long as Seely is making use of them. Seely is under 
no duty to Lasson to permit them to flow into the slough. 
He has the right to direct them into the slough and take 
them out on the other side to sub-irrigate his meadow and 
keep the grass green. Section 100-3-20, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, is sufficient authority for this statement. 
This is what Seely proposes to do. It will not be a diffi-
cult operation. All that is necessary is for him to place a 
box or some measuring device in the dam so that he can 
measure the amount of water going over the dam and down 
the stream at the time he empties his irrigation water into 
the slough and see to it that the flow down stream is not 
diminished while the irrigation water is being applied to the 
little meadow on the west side. The flow of the stream will 
still go on down to Lasson. See Smithfield West Bench Irri-
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gation Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., _ Utah —_, 
195 P2d 249, prior appeal in 105 Utah 468,142 P2d 866; also 
Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 419, 136 Pac. 957. 
(d) The surface waters, meaning the rains and snow 
which fall upon Seely's land, regardless of the law of ri-
parian rights and the doctrine of apropriation, are nature's 
gift to the land owner when they are beneficient. 
At 67 C. J. 868, Sec. 287, it is said: 
". . . . a land owner has the right to collect 
and appropriate to his own use all the surface waters 
upon his property without liability to other owners 
upon whose property it would flow if not appropriated." 
Wiel, (3rd Ed.) Vol. I, page 379, says: 
"Diffused surface water cannot be appropriated 
against the land owner on whose land it lies. Its pres-
ence and movements are too capricious to found any 
right upon distinct from the land where it is gathered, 
and such water is owned by the owner of the land 
where it happens to lie." 
See also Wiel at page 379, Sec. 349. 
Also the following from I Wiel, page 38, quoting from 
Baron Alderson in Broadbent v. Ramsbothem: 
"No doubt, all water falling from heaven, and shed 
upon the surface of a hill, at the foot of which a brook 
runs, must by the natural force of gravity, find its way 
to the bottom, and so into the brook; but this does not 
prevent the owner of the land on which this water falls 
from dealing with it as he may please, and appropri-
ating it. He cannot, it is true, if the water has arrived 
at and is following in some natural channel already 
formed. But he has a perfect right to appropriate it 
before it arrives at such channel." 
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See also Kinney, Vol. 2, page 1146: 
"Surface water, however, may be captured and 
impounded in any method advisable by a land owner 
over whose lands such waters have flowed, and, when 
so captured, it becomes the absolute property of such 
land owner and is not subject to appropriation by oth-
ers." 
It is submitted that the legislature did not intend by 
the amendment of 1935 to bring surface waters within the 
orbit of waters which may not be used by a land owner 
without a license from the state engineer. It will come as 
a surprise to all of us if it should turn out that a man may 
not plow his land on the contour, or seed it to grass and 
other vegetation to retard the runoff of the surface water, 
and take any and all measures he may please to take in or-
der to conserve the water in his soil, without getting an 
application to appropriate such waters through the office of 
the state engineer or else being able to prove a diligence 
right acquired before 1903. 
There must be some limits beyond which the doctrine 
of appropriation of waters may not be extended either by 
legislation or by judicial holdings without its coming in con-
flict with the vested rights of land owners and hence in con-
flict with the provisions of the state constitution (Art. I, 
Sec. 7) and the federal constitution fifth amendment and 
Art. I, Sec. 22 of the state constitution. 
It is incredible that the legislature intended by its dec-
laration that all waters on and under the ground are pub-
lic waters and that the only way in which any person can 
acquire the right to use any of them for any purpose is to 
make an application to the state engineer, publish notice, 
and go through the whole procedure required by the stat-
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utes, to apply to the rights which the owners of land have 
always exercised with respect to the surface waters. 
(e) Percolating waters in Seely's land. Since the de-
cision of this Court in Riorden v. Westwood, et al., on March 
11, 1949, Utah , 203 P2d 922, a consideration 
of the various classifications of percolating waters which 
text writers and the courts have mentioned is unnecessary 
and will not be attempted. 
That case is authority for the proposition that perco* 
lating waters in private lands, when they are not being put 
to some beneficial use by the land owner and do not con-
tribute to any useful purpose connected with the occupa-
tion and use of the land, are public waters; hence they may 
be appropriated by strangers to the title to the land as are 
other public waters of the state, providing the would-be ap-
propriator obtains a grant from the land owner or con-
demns the right to enter upon the property to make his di-
version and use. 
But it is submitted that the case does not destroy the 
law which has been followed by this Court in many cases, 
which is that a land owner is the owner of waters which 
are percolating through his ground so long as they are con-
tributing to some useful purpose connected with his own-
ership and occupancy of the land; or at least, that they 
are not public waters until it be shown that they are not 
being put to some beneficial use on the land and do not con-
tribute to some useful purpose connected with the owner-
ship and occupancy. 
Mr. Justice Wade, in the prevailing opinion in the Ri-
orden case, says: 
"This court throughout its history has recognized 
that percolating waters are not public waters but be-
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long to the soil through which they pass and are the 
property of the owner thereof, and are not the subject 
of appropriation." 
The Utah cases on that proposition are all cited in the 
prevailing opinion, so will not be listed here. But we do re-
spectfully call the Court's attention to one case therein cit-
ed, which is not a case which was decided by this Court. 
It went to the Supreme Court of the United States through 
the federal courts. The case is Midway Irrig. Co. v. Snake 
Creek Mining & Tunnel Co., 8 Cir., 271 Fed. 157, affirmed 
260 U. S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215, 67 L. Ed. 4423. 
A concise statement of the Utah law upon the subject 
of the right of the land owner to the use of the water per-
colating therein is contained in the brief submitted by the 
late A. B. Irvine and Samuel R. Thurman in the Midway 
case. They write: 
"The right of the owner of the land to the water 
percolating therein is limited to a reasonable and bene-
ficial use of the water upon the land itself, or to some 
useful purpose connected with its occupation and en-
joyment. This doctrine is now so prevalent in this 
country as to be designated "The American doctrine.,, 
So while it cannot be said, in the light of the cases in 
this state, that the owner of the land is the owner of the 
water therein which is percolating through the soil, in the 
full meaning of that term, as he is of the silica or clay or 
other constituents, he nevertheless is the owner of the right 
to make any reasonable and beneficial use of the percolat-
ing waters upon his lands, or he may, as land owner, aside 
from all considerations of the law of appropriation, make 
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any reasonable use of them for any useful purpose connec-
ted with the use and occupation of the land. 
This right is certainly a valuable property right. 
It is suggested in the opinions filed by Mr. Justice Lati-
mer and Mr. Justice Wolfe in the Riorden case that all wa-
ters in the state, whether on the surface or under the 
ground, are and always have been public waters; and that 
the only way in which the land owner may maintain any 
right to use them on the land is for him to show a diligence 
right under the law of appropriation of former times or an 
approved application in the state engineer's office since 
1903; and, by Justice Wolfe, that the only purpose of the 
amendment in 1935 of Section 100-1-1, Code, was to bring 
such waters under the jurisdiction of the state engineer 
so as to require his approval of an application before any-
one, even including the land owner, can acquire a right to 
their use. 
Point 1 
THE DECREE IS CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE 
IT DEPRIVES SEELY OF HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
HIS LAND AND CASTS BURDENS UPON THE LAND 
FOR LASSOES BENEFIT WHICH ARE NOT SANC-
TIONED BY THE LAWS OF THIS STATE. 
Seely has the right as land owner to fill in the slough 
so as to restore it to the condition in which it existed when 
Lasson's appropriation became a vested right. His only 
duty or obligation in this respect is that he permit the flow 
of the stream to go on down to Lasson without appreciable 
dimunition or contamination. To restore the stream to its 
former condition will not lessen the flow to Lasson's point 
of diversion; it will not even change the course of the 
stream. But the decree restrains him from filling in the 
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gulch to the bottom of the old bed. Seely has the right 
to restore the bed to its former condition to prevent addi-
tional damage to his land by erosion of the banks. The de-
cree says he must not do this. He may only place check 
dams in the bottom of the eroded channel to prevent its 
being gouged out deeper; but it emphatically declares that 
he must not fill in between the steep banks. Seely has the 
right to prevent the drainage of his land into the slough 
to the damage of the meadows and pastures which border 
upon the slough. One purpose for filling in between the 
perpendicular banks is to prevent this rapid drainage which 
is now going on. The decree enjoins him from doing this. 
Seely has the right to direct the irrigation waters which he 
brings to his lands across the slough for the benefit of the 
pasture on the west side, and to dam the slough for that 
purpose, providing he permits Lasson's water to go on down 
the stream. But the decree enjoins him from doing this 
because any dam which did not raise the water in the slough 
to the height of the old ditch would be ineffective. He 
could and would use the dam for this purpose, if not en-
joined, and there would be no interference whatever with 
Lasson's water rights. 
The trouble is that Lasson claims more rights over 
Seely's land than he is lawfully entitled to claim just be-
cause he is an appropriator from the stream after it has 
passed out of the Seely property. He in effect claims that 
Seely is obligated to permit all of the rain water and melting 
snow water, all of the irrigation water runoff, and all of the 
percolating water in his land to go on down the slough for 
Lasson's benefit. The decree in effect sanctions these claims. 
In this respect the decree is contrary to law because, as it 
has been made to appear above, Seely has the right to make 
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any reasonable and beneficial use of such waters that he 
may desire while they are upon his own land 
The appropriator cannot lawfully require the land own-
er to permit such waters to flow down stream unobstructed 
by any use which the land owner may make of his own 
property. Lasson's rights to the use of those waters do 
not begin until Seely's rights to their use end. Seely's rights 
are not based upon the doctrine of riparian rights in waters 
nor upon the doctrine of the appropriation of waters in the 
arid land states. They are based upon his ownership of the 
title to the land. Therefore Lasson's right to the use of 
such waters does not begin until the waters are abandoned 
by Seely and flow into the slough and pass out of his con-
trol and cease to be useful to him in the use and occupancy 
of his land. So any interference with such waters in the 
slough by the construction of the dam is something about 
which Lasson had no legal right to complain; is something 
which caused him no damage, because they are not his wa-
ters until Seely is through with them; and the decree is 
wrong because it deprives Seely of his rights to make use 
of such waters on his land in the manner stated in his tes-
timony. 
If Section 100-1-1, Code, as amended in 1935, be so 
construed by the Court as to require the Court to hold that 
Seely does not have any of the rights herein discussed in 
the rain water and melting snows on his land, in the irri-
gation water which he brings to his land, and the waters 
which are percolating through his land, then the statute 
as so construed is void, because is deprives Seely of his 
property rights without due process of law. Art. I, Sec. 
7, state constitution; Fifth Amendment to the federal con-
stitution. 
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Since the decree effectively destroys the property 
rights of the land owner and requires him to hold his prop-
erty in its present condition for the benefit of Lasson, and 
imposes burdens upon the land which are not lawfully at-
tached to the title, it takes Seely's property for a public 
use without compensation; hence it is in violation of the 
rights guaranteed to Seely by the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal constitution and Section 22 of Article I of the state 
constitution; the use of water for irrigation purposes being 
a public use. Section 100-1-5, Code. 
The decree goes too far even if it be admitted for the 
sake of the argument, which we do not admit, that Seely 
ought to be enjoined from retarding the flow of the stream 
to the extent that it does flow without the contributions 
which are made from the waters which Seely has the right 
to use on his own land. It goes too far because it restrains 
him from using the waters on his land which he has a per-
fect right to use but in effect requires that he permit them 
without interference to flow into the slough and on down 
to Lasson's point of diversion. So it in effect takes his 
property for a public use without any compensation; takes 
it from Seely and bestows it upon Lasson; and deprives him 
of his property without due process of law. 
In Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 Pac. 
194, 72 A.L.R. 657, this Court held that an injunction which 
restrained a land owner from grazing his goats on his own 
land within 300 feet of a stream deprived him of his prop-
erty without due process of law. 
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Point 2 
THE DECREE IS CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE 
IT RESTRAINS SEELY FROM DOING SOMETHING 
WHICH HE HAS NEVER THREATENED TO DO AND 
HAS NO INTENTION OF DOING. 
We will show under another point that Lasson has not 
lost any appreciable amount of water and will not lose any 
by reason of the dam constructed as proposed. What we 
claim under this point is that Seely has not threatened and 
does not intend to do anything which will be injurious to 
Lasson in his right to the use of the waters of the slough; 
hence there is no warrant at all for any injunction. 
Seely testified that he intends to fill the slough between 
the railroad bridge and his north boundary, between the 
perpendicular banks, leaving the slough large enough for 
the water to run through. (Tr. 295-295). He wants to do 
this to stop soil erosion and so that his stock can cross over, 
to fill in what has already been eroded out. (Tr. 296). He 
proposes to put in a series of dams to check the floods and 
the spring runoff. (Tr. 297). He claims no interest in 
Lasson's water rights. He has no intention of interfering 
with them. After June 15 he wants to put some of his own 
water in the slough and take it out on the west side to sub-
irrigate a little meadow, measuring the water out. If there 
should be any loss to Lasson while the pond is filling or 
from seepage or evaporation, he would expect to make up 
that loss. He intends to use the dam in such a way that 
the flow to Lasson will not be diminished to any appreci-
able extent. (Tr. 298-299). 
We submit that this testimony is not sufficient evidence 
upon which to base finding of fact No. 11; that said finding 
is not supported by the evidence; and that the decree is con-
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trary to law because there is no need whatever for the in-
junction. The water always went on down to Lasson be-
fore the deep gulch was cut in Seely's land by the floods; 
it will continue to go down to him in the same channel when 
the deep gulch is filled in all the way through Seely's past-
ure, because the slough will still be there just as it was be-
fore those floods. The flow of the stream to which Lasson 
is entitled is the flow which passed over the land when his 
appropriation was initiated. This flow he can demand as 
of right. This flow he will always receive when the deep 
gulch is filled in and the slough restored to its ancient con-
dition. The proposed dam will benefit Seely and will not 
damage Lasson. 
Aside from the question of the relative rights of the 
parties, considered as matter of law, the equities are not 
with the plaintiff. Seely only wants to do what any pru-
dent and intelligent land owner would do to make the best 
use of his property, believing he has a perfect right to do 
it. He realizes that Lasson has a right to the use of the 
water in the slough and respects that right. He proposes 
to construct the dam so that the slough waters will always 
flow over it, as may easily be done, and to measure out any 
water which he puts in and takes out on the other side, 
allowing credit to Lasson for any loss thereby caused to 
the natural flow of the stream. This is fairness and equity. 
Lasson, on the other hand, wants Seely to let nature take 
its course with the Seely meadow even if nature should 
cause the utter destruction of the meadow by the drainage 
of the land. This is not equity. 
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Point 3 
THAT PART OF FINDING NO. 9, WHICH IS TO 
THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT IMPOUNDED THE 
WATERS OF THE SLOUGH AND THEREBY PREVEN-
TED PLAINTIFF FROM RECEIVING WATERS TO THE 
USE OF WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED IS NOT SUPPORT-
ED BY BUT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence regarding the loss of water is summarized 
as follows: 
The dam was placed in the slough in the spring of 1948. 
But it was not until June 21, 1949, that Lasson discovered 
or noticed any shortage of water or made any complaint 
about the dam. On that day he had only .34 c. f. s. of wa-
ter at the weir, which was too small a stream to irrigate 
with. (Tr. 117). So he followed up the stream to see what 
was the matter. The dam was tight in the bottom and no 
water was going through. (Tr. 118). His next measure-
ment, which he made on June 23, showed that he had 1.12 
c. f. s. He went back to the dam on June 28 and 29; the 
water was then backed up higher behind the dam than it 
was on the 21st, being 3 feet and 5 inches deep, and there 
was water seeping through the dam. (Tr. 118). On June 
27 and 28 he had .51 c. f. s. at the weir; on June 20 he had 
.72 c. f. s., which was the day after he had removed the 
dam. Thereafter through July he had .51 c. f. s. at the 
weir. So that his only possible loss was .17 c. f. s, on the 
day of June 21, if he lost any by reason of the dam; this 
being the difference between the .51 c. f. s. which he might 
expect to receive from the natural flow of the stream and 
the .34 c. f. s. which he actually did receive that day. (Tr. 
115, 117, 150, 214, 215, 183, 184). On May 18 his land 
was soaked. (Tr. 151). At all times, according to the table 
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of measurements, right down to June 21, he had plenty of 
water. On May 17, 1949, there was a flow of 37.98 c. f. s. 
going over the weir, when it was raining. (Tr. 150). 
Now, let it be remembered that the dam was placed 
in the slough in the spring of 1948. The pond behind the 
dam had been filled that year with the spring run-off and 
with the irrigation water applied to the lands above the 
dam. It had also been replenished with the run-off in the 
spring of 1949 and with the waste water from the irriga-
tion. So the ground was saturated and there was no loss 
from seepage because of the dam. The natural flow of the 
stream was going through or over the dam. Only on one 
day was the quantity of water at the weir less than the .51 
c. f. s. which Lasson's own measurements show is the flow 
of living water in the stream. That was on June 21. This 
might well have been one of those hot days when the 
stream was lowered by evaporation. But be that as it may, 
this was not such a substantial loss as to justify the judg-
ment for damages and for the injunction and the justify the 
finding and the judgment based thereon that Seely has sub-
stantially interfered with the natural flow of the stream. 
A dimunition of the flow of the stream for one day to the 
extent of .17 c. f. s., under the conditions existing in this 
locality, cannot be said to be a substantial interference with 
the rights of the plaintiff. 
The fluctuations in the flow of the stream which are 
exhibited by the table of measurements are accounted for 
by two factors: (1) The rains. Lasson had plenty of 
water on the days when it rained that summer. There was 
more water in the slough than he could use. (2) The ap-
plication of irrigation water to the Seely lands and other 
lands which lie east and south of the slough. The waste 
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water from those lands flows into the slough above the dam. 
When the lands are being irrigated Lasson gets the waste 
water, his stream is increased in flow. As the water is 
changed about on these lands, the waste water fluctuates 
because there is a lapse between the time when water is 
turned on to a tract of land and the time when it runs off 
at the end of the tract into the slough. Lesson gets the 
benefit of all the waste water from all the lands above the 
slough, and, so far as Seely is concerned, he is entitled to 
it when it gets into the slough and out of Seely's control. 
But Seely is under no duty to permit the waste water to 
flow into the slough. If he can intercept it before it gets 
into the slough and direct it to other tracts, or keep it with-
in his control by emptying it into the slough and then tak-
ing it out on the west side, as he proposed to do, he has a 
perfect right to do these things. Lasson cannot complain 
it' he does either of them. It is evident from a reading of 
the entire record that any difference in the flow of the 
stream between the maximum measurement of 37.98 c. f. s., 
on May 17, when it rained, and the .51 c. f. s., which his 
own measurements show to be the natural flow of the 
stream, is due to rain fall and to the changing of the irri-
gation waters on the lands which drain into the slough. 
These fluctuations were not caused by the dam. Lasson 
did not lose any water on account of the dam. If the hot 
sun of summer drew toward himself .17 c. f. s of the flow 
of the stream on June 21, which is likely what happened, 
Seely is not to be held liable for that act of God. If Seely 
and the other land owners above the slough changed the 
waters on their lands and so diminished for a time the flow 
of waste water into the slough, which is unquestionably 
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what happened, this is something about which the plaintiff 
has no right to complain. 
Appellant therefore claims that the evidence does not 
support the finding that Seely deprived Lasson of water 
to which he was entitled. 
Point 4 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 12 IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The court found that plaintiff had been damaged on 
account of loss of water and consequent loss of crops to the 
extent of $126.75, and awarded him judgment for that sum 
and for his costs. 
The evidence regarding the damages is as follows: 
Andrew Lasson, brother of plaintiff, testified: 
He noticed a shortage of hay crop on his brother's land 
in 1949. (Tr. 71). Wild hay was worth $13.00 per ton in 
the stack. (Tr. 72). It cost in the neighborhood of $4.00 
to put it up. (Tr. 73). He estimated there was a shortage 
of about 6 tons of hay on Lasson's 15 acres. (Tr. 73-74). 
The pasture was not as good as it would have been if the 
land had been watered during the latter part of June. (Tr. 
74). In his judgment there was a loss of $10.00 in the past-
urage. The land was irrigated last around June 15, but he 
did not know when. (Tr. 76-77). Lasson put the water 
on the meadow when he took the dam out on June 29. (Tr. 
77). 
Arthur Lasson, plaintiff, testified: 
It took him and his hired man the better part of a 
day to take out the dam. His services and the use of his 
car were worth $12.00. (Tr. 121). He was watering his 
land between June 15 and 17, 20 acres of wild hay and lu-
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cerne and 4y2 acres of wheat. Ie needed water. (Tr. 122, 
123). From June 21 to June 29 there was just a mere 
drizzle of water and he could not irrigate his crops with it. 
Some of the hay dried up, didn't dry clear up but suffered 
from lack of water and the grain needed water. (Tr. 124). 
(Note:—See his table of measurements, showing that 
between June 21 and June 29 he had not less than .51 c. 
f. s. on any day except June 21, when he had .34 c. f. s.; 
and that on the 17th he had 1.34 c. f. s., and on the 23rd 
1.12, when it rained). 
He cuts his hay once a year, generally gets 2 tons 
to the acre over the 20 acres. (Tr. 125). The hay was 
worth $13.00 per ton in 1949. After the dam was removed 
and the flush of water was over on June 30 the water in 
Panawats slough was enough to water the land. (Note:— 
He then had .51 c. f. s. See table.) During the period of 
June 21 to June 29, with the exception of one day when 
the flush came, he could not irrigate those lands with the 
water flowing in the slough. (Tr. 128). In his judgment 
he lost about 7 tons of hay and about 25 bushels of wheat 
because he did not water his land the latter part of June, 
1949. The value of the wheat was $1.75 per bushel. (Tr. 
132). 
On cross examination: (Tr. 182) He put all the wa-
ter of Panawats slough on that land between the 1st and 
the 10th of June; after June 10th he put none of it on that 
land; he turned it off so that the ground could dry out a 
little so that he could cut the hay. The hay was cut around 
July 4th. (Tr. 182). He raised 110 bushels of grain on 
the. 4y2 acres last year. (Tr. 180). He watered it once 
before June 15, the biggest part of it was headed out on 
June 15. It needed water after that date. He raised lx/2 
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tons of hay to the acre on that hay land last year. He cut 
it right after July 4. He got a good pasture but not as 
good as it would have been if it had been watered more. 
But he did not put all the slough water on that land. (Tr. 
181). 
The foregoing is all the evidence in the case relative 
to the damages. It is clear that he lost no crops because 
Seely shut off his water. According to his own testimony 
he had water to use but did not use it on that land. Ac-
cording to his own testimony his hay land did not need 
water, for he testified that he had to turn the water off so 
that he could cut the hay. He had plenty of water for the 
4y2 acres of wheat but did not use it. In the first place, 
we seriously question the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain a conclusion that he lost any crops at all because 
of lack of water. In the second place, we say the evidence 
shows that if he did lose any hay or grain crop because of 
the lack of water during the latter part of June, it was his 
own doing and not because Seely deprived him of any wa-
ter; for he had plenty of water for the purpose and did not 
use it on those crops. And in the third place we say that 
the amount of damages is wholly speculative. There is no 
foundation in the evidence from which a rational judgment 
can be adduced as to the extent of his damages. 
The judgment for damages should therefore not be 
permitted to stand. Likewise the judgment for costs. 
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POINT 5 
THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT ARE CON-
TRARY TO LAW BECAUSE LASSON WAS A TRES-
PASSER ON SEELY'S LAND AND THE CONCLUSIONS 
AND JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN FAVOR 
OF SEELY. 
Lasson has no right in Seely's land. Seely has the 
fee simple title thereto. Lasson trespassed when he went 
up there and removed the dam which Seely was in the pro-
cess of building on his own property for his own purposes. 
Lasson had no right to remove that dam. It was not with-
in his rights as an appropriator on the stream to regulate 
Seely in the use of his land and to tell him whether or not 
he may direct the flow of the waters over his property or 
to go upon the land and remove any of the improvements 
which Seely may place thereon, just because he may have 
the idea that Seely may be interfering with his water 
rights. His right of self-help does not go that far. He 
may not lawfully take matters into his own hands, and, 
over Seely's objections, remove the dam. If he thought 
the dam interfered with the flow of the water, he had his 
remedy by action in the courts. It is true that Lasson has 
a vested right in the stream to its source. Chandler v. 
Utah Copper Co., 43 Utah 479. But this interest is merely 
the right to have the water flow down to him in quantity 
and quality to satisfy his appropriation. Larson, J., in 
Adams v. Portage Irrig. & Res. Co., _ Utah , 72 
P2d 653. Lasson might just as logically claim the right to 
tell Seely how to irrigate his lands because if he runs the 
water over the land in one way there will be a greater run-
off into the slough to Lasson's benefit than if the furrows 
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follow the contour. In fact, he does claim such right, as 
appears from the cross examination of Seely. 
See I Wiel, 48, 244, 247, 249; 
Jones, et ux. v. Mclntire, 60 Idaho, 228, 91 P 2d 373; 
67 C. J. 1003; 
Butte Canal & D. Co. v Vaughe, 11 Cal. 143, 70 Am. 
Dec. 769; 
Naches v. Weikel, 87 Wash. 224, 151 Pac. 494. 
It will be argued that Lasson has an easement over 
Seely's land for the benefit of plaintiff's land which is irri-
gated from the stream. But he has no easement. There is 
no appropriation or diversion from the stream on Seely's 
land, there is no ditch, canal or reservoir thereon which 
has ever been used by Lasson or any of his predecessors. 
If he has such an easement, how did he get it? Easements 
lie in grant or prescription, which presumes a grant, or 
from reservations in conveyances. There is nothing like 
any of these things here. Lasson has never conveyed any 
water over Seely's land through Panawats slough. The 
water has passed over the land in a natural stream, direc-
ted by the forces of nature without any help from Lasson. 
Lasson's point of diversion is down stream from Seely's 
land, at a point where the stream flows over Lasson's land. 
It is true that there are loose statements in some text books 
and in some cases to the effect that an appropriator has 
an easement over the land across which flows a natural 
stream of water; just as there are statements declaring that 
the appropriator has an interest in the stream to its source. 
But all that is meant by such statements is that the approp-
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riator has a right to have the stream flow down to him un-
diminished and unobstructed as it was when his right be-
came vested to the use of the water. To hold that Lasson 
has an easement over Seely's land will establish a principle 
which will cloud the titles to all the lands in this state 
which are traversed by natural streams. If Lasson has an 
easement, then all the appropriators down the stream, even 
to the Great Salt Lake, have easements over Seely's land 
for the benefit of their several lands. If such a principle 
of law should be established, then how in the world can 
anyone know or determine the condition of his title? 
But even if Lasson has some sort of easement over 
the land, this fact does not excuse or justify his trespass; 
for he did not follow the course of the stream when he went 
up there and took out the dam. He went around and en-
tered the land on the west side and crossed down to the 
dam, following a course at right angles to the course of the 
stream. This was a trespass under any view of the law. 
We do not claim for it anything more than nominal dam-
ages. But it was sufficient in importance to entitle Seely 
to prevail on his counterclaim and to his costs. 
For the reasons stated it is respectfully submitted that 
the judgment and decree should be reversed and the lower 
court directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant on 
his counterclaim and for costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DILWORTH WOOLLEY, 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Manti, Utah. 
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